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Bin Mei and Changyou Sun
The U.S. paper industry has become increasingly concentrated and therefore been suspected
of imperfect competition. In this study, the new empirical industrial organization approach
is employed to measure the degree of oligopoly and oligopsony power in the U.S. paper
industry simultaneously. The model is estimated by iterative three-stage least squares using
annual data from 1955 to 2003. The results reveal that there has been significant oligopoly
and oligopsony power in the U.S. paper industry, and the oligopoly power has been
consistently lower than the oligopsony power.
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The forest products industry has been a major
component of the manufacturing sector in the
United States (U.S. Census Bureau 2007a). It
has provided numerous job opportunities and
generated income in billions of dollars. The
U.S. forest products industry is usually
divided into three subindustries: the lumber
industry (NAICS 321 or SIC 24),
1 furniture
industry (NAICS 337 or SIC 25), and paper
industry (NAICS 322 or SIC 26). Among the
three subindustries, the paper industry is the
largest in terms of value of shipments and
employment. According to the latest Annual
Survey of Manufacturing (U.S. Census Bu-
reau 2007a), in 2005 the value of shipments for
the paper industry reached $163 billion, and
the employment totaled 429,000, or 45% and
29% of the forest products industry, respec-
tively.
The paper industry has several distinct
characteristics. Pulpwood, the raw material
for paper mills, is bulky to transport. On
average, harvesting and transportation costs
account for two-thirds of the delivered price
for pine pulpwood (Guo, Sun, and Grebner).
High transportation costs of timber materials
can mitigate competition and increase the
potential exercise of local market power
(Murray). In addition, the paper industry is
a capital-intensive manufacturing sector in the
U.S. economy. While capital recovery and
fixed costs remain a large component of
manufacturing costs (Ince), high capital costs
due to the stringent environmental regulations
on the paper industry have created barriers to
entry and motivated mergers and acquisitions
within the industry (Asinas; Gomez).
The U.S. paper industry has become
increasingly concentrated over time, as indi-
cated by the share of value of shipments
accounted for by the largest four companies
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# 2008 Southern Agricultural Economics Association(i.e., CR4). The CR4 for the paper industry
was 18% in 1954 and reached 49% in 2002
(U.S. Census Bureau 2007a). This situation
has been further aggravated by increasing
mergers observed in recent years (Mei and
Sun). Overall, the evolution of the paper
industry has made it structurally concentrated
with a few big processing firms, a large
number of forest landowners as timber sup-
pliers, and numerous paper products retailers.
Such an industry structure has aroused wide
concerns about potential market power in
both the paper products output and pulpwood
input markets (Bernstein).
The objective of this study is to measure
the degree of market power in the paper
products output and pulpwood input markets
simultaneously for the U.S. paper industry
during the span of 1955–2003. An econometric
equation system is composed of a production
function and three cost share equations for
pulpwood, capital, and labor inputs. The
system is estimated separately with and
without the specification of time-varying
conjectural elasticities by iterative three-stage
least squares (I3SLS). This study extends the
existing literature of market power related to
the U.S. paper industry by examining the
time-varying oligopoly and oligopsony power
jointly over the past several decades. Results
from this study will be helpful in understand-
ing the evolution of market behavior in the
U.S. paper industry.
The next section provides a literature
review of market power research with empha-
sis on the U.S. forest products industry. The
third section demonstrates the primal ap-
proach within the theoretical framework of
industrial organization. The econometric spec-
ification is outlined in the fourth section,
which is followed by the data section. Empir-
ical results are discussed in the sixth section,
and the final section concludes the paper.
Literature Review
As summarized by several excellent reviews,
market power possessed by industrial firms
has been an issue of great interest (e.g.,
Bresnahan; Digal and Ahmadi-Esfahani).
Overall, there have been two major parametric
methods in measuring market power: the
structure-conduct-performance paradigm
(SCPP) approach and the new empirical
industrial organization (NEIO) approach.
Prior to the 1980s, the SCPP approach was
the dominant method. Based on the assump-
tion that the level of competition could be
implied by an industry’s structural features,
the SCPP approach tries to establish a direct
linkage from industry structure to conduct.
However, the SCPP approach has been
criticized during and after the 1980s because
the relationship between industry structure
and conduct is not unambiguously predicted
by the theory of imperfect competition, and
high concentration in an industry does not
necessarily imply noncompetitive behavior
(Ronnila and Toppinen).
To examine the existence of market power
more rigorously, researchers have gradually
turned to the NEIO approach. One prominent
component of the NEIO approach is to
estimate conjectural elasticities, also known
as market conduct parameters. Conjectural
elasticities measure the overall market reaction
to an individual firm’s change in output
supply and input demand. Our review of the
NEIO studies reveals two features particularly
related to the objective of this study. One
feature is that most efforts in the NEIO
literature have been spent to investigate
oligopoly or oligopsony power at one stage
of the market, typically the processing sector,
while maintaining implicitly an assumption of
perfect competition at other stages of the
market. Research that considers both markets
simultaneously has been limited (e.g., Alston,
Sexton, and Zhang; Azzam and Pagoulatos;
Schroeter; Sexton; Wann and Sexton). Models
that focuses only on oligopoly or on oligop-
sony power run the risk of understating the
extent of market power distortion or errone-
ously attributing distortions to the wrong
form of market power because any structure
bases for concern about oligopoly power
usually imply parallel concerns about oligop-
sony power and vice versa (Sexton).
The other feature is that many NEIO
models measure market power by point esti-
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data. One restrictive aspect of these studies is
that they constrain conjectural elasticities to be
constant throughout the sample period. There-
fore, these studies are incapable of addressing
one important question in market power
research: Has market power of an industry
changed with evolving industry structure over
time? Some studies (e.g., Schroeter and Azzam)
have allowed conjectural elasticities to vary
through time. Conjectural elasticity is usually
expressed as a function of some exogenous
explanatory variables. By substituting the
expression into the system of equations for




For the paper industry, market power
research and application of the NEIO ap-
proach have been limited. Most of these
studies are conducted in Canada, Finland,
Norway, and Sweden. Bernstein finds com-
petitive behavior in both the output and input
markets in the Canadian sawmill and paper
industries after accounting for capital adjust-
ment costs. Ronnila and Toppinen apply
duality to derive the factor demand system,
and the static estimation shows that the
pulpwood market in Finland has been com-
petitive from 1965 to 1994. Based on data for
individual Norwegian sawmills from 1974 to
1991, Stordal and Baardsen incorporate cross-
sectional and temporal effects in examining
price-taking behavior, and market power is
found for some time periods. Bergman and
Brannlund test market power for the Swedish
pulpwood market. The estimates of strongly
time-varying conjectural elasticities indicate
an unstable cartel situation. Bergman and
Nilsson find only weak evidence of market
power for the Swedish pulp and paper
industry by a conjectural elasticity model
using industry data from 1970 to 1993.
Several studies have been conducted for the
paper industry in the United States. Murray
examines oligopsony power in both the U.S.
pulpwood and sawlog markets. The wood
input is modeled as a quasi-fixed factor, so its
shadow price can be estimated from a flexible-
form profit function. To explore time-varying
market power index, a polynomial function of
fuel cost and average mill capacity is em-
ployed. The results reveal that the U.S.
pulpwood market is more oligopsonistic than
the sawlog market. Based on the single-
equation analysis, Yerger examines market
power in the U.S. pulp export market. While
imperfect competition is found in the chemical
pulp export market, there is no clear evidence
for either perfect competition or presence of
market power in the U.S. sulfate pulp export
market. Asinas tests market power of the U.S.
paper and lumber industries, and his findings
are consistent with Murray’s except the
magnitudes of market power exertion. Most
recently, Hervani analyzes the impact of
market power on the recycled newspaper
market. Using an index analogous to the
Lerner index, he finds some oligopsonistic
behavior among the recycled-content news-
print manufacturers, and the oligopsony
market power enables these mills to exert a
larger price-cost margin in the recycled news-
paper input market.
Given the importance of the paper industry
to the U.S. economy and the limited research
in testing oligopoly and oligopsony power
jointly in the U.S. paper industry, there has
been a great need to examine its industrial
organization, especially after the frequent
restructuring activities in recent decades.
Theoretical Framework
There are generally two approaches in the
theoretical framework of conjectural elasticity
(Wann and Sexton). The primal production
function-based approach begins with the
specification of a profit function. In optimum,
when profit is maximized, the input demands
can be obtained by Hotelling’s lemma. In
contrast, the dual cost function–based ap-
proach starts with the identification of a cost
function. In optimum, when cost is minimized,
the input demands can be derived by Shep-
hard’s lemma. In either way, the system of
equations for output production and input
demands in equilibrium can be jointly estimat-
ed and the conjectural elasticity can be
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limited in deriving an expression for the
conjectural elasticity in the factor market
unless the production technology is restricted
to consist of fixed proportions between the
output and the input purchased with oligop-
sony power. Consequently, the conjectural
elasticities in the output and input markets
turn out to be identical since the quantities of
output and input can be represented by the
same variable with appropriately chosen di-
mensions (Schroeter). In this study, we choose
to use the primal approach to test price-taking
behavior in the U.S. paper industry without
restricting the conjectural elasticities in the
output and input market to be identical.
Consider the U.S. paper industry with N
firms. A representative firm (j) produces a
homogenous output (qj) using inputs of wood
(x1), labor (x2), capital (x3), and nonwood
materials (x4) with prices w1, w2, w3,a n dw4,
respectively. Assume the firm exercises market
power in selling its paper products output and
in purchasing the pulpwood input, but it is a
price taker in the markets for other inputs.
Furthermore, assume each firm is profit
maximizing so the optimum for firm j (j 5
1, 2, . . . , N) is to choose input xkj (k 5 1, 2, 3,
4) that maximizes its profit.
Based on these assumptions, the NEIO
approach begins with defining the following
threefunctions(AzzamandPagoulatos):thejth
firm’s production function, the inverse output
demand function for the industry, and the
inverse supply function of the pulpwood input:
ð1Þ qj ~ fx 1j,x2j,x3j,x4j
  
,
ð2Þ P ~ gQ ðÞ ,
ð3Þ w1 ~ hX 1 ðÞ ,
where P is the market price for paper products;
Q ~
PN
j~1 qj is the total industry output; and
X1 ~
PN








k~1 wkxkj, j ~ 1,2,...,N,
subject to Equations (1)–(3). The first-order
conditions corresponding to this profit maxi-
mization require that the marginal value
product of an input equals the perceived





















fxkj, k ~ 2,3,4,
where g 5 qQ 3 P/(qP 3 Q) is the price
elasticity of the output demand; e 5 qX1 3 w1/
(qw1 3 X1) is the price elasticity of the
pulpwood input supply; hj 5 qQ 3 qj/(qqj 3
Q)i st h ejth firm’s conjectural elasticity in the
outputmarket;wj5qX13x1j/(qx1j3X1)isthe
jth firm’s conjectural elasticity in the input
market; and fxkj ~ Lqj
 
Lxkj is the marginal
product of the kth input used by firm j.
Conjectural elasticities (hj and Qj) provide
benchmarks in examining price-taking behav-
ior or the degree of competitiveness (Appel-
baum). The parameter hj M [0, 1] measures
departures from competition in selling the
output. The value hj 5 0 denotes perfect
competition; hj 5 1 denotes pure monopoly;
and other values denote various degrees of
oligopoly power with higher values of hj
denoting greater departures from competition.
The parameter Qj plays a similar role in terms
of procurement of the pulpwood input,
denoting possible perfect competition, mo-
nopsony, and various degrees of oligopsony
power.
In practice, absence of price and quantity
data for the output and inputs at the firm level
generally results in considering the problem at
the industry level. In doing so, an additional
assumption needs to be maintained to make
the preceding analysis applicable to the
behavior of an industry as a whole. The
assumption is that, in equilibrium, the conjec-
tural elasticities are invariant across firms
(Appelbaum), i.e., hj 5 h,a n dwj 5 w, j 5 1,
2 ,...,N, so that all the firms face identical
marginal prices. As a result, the aggregate
analogue of the optimality conditions can be
written as




















fxk, k ~ 2,3,4:
The foregoing model is similar to that by
Zhang and Sexton in that both oligopoly and
oligopsony power are considered within a
single framework. However, it is more general
since the assumption of fixed proportions is
relaxed (Kinnucan). The null hypothesis in
this study is that the conjectural elasticities in
the U.S. paper industry equal zero. Rejecting
it should suggest that the U.S. paper industry
exerts market power in either the products
market or factor market, or both.
Econometric Model
In order to estimate the model described
above, specifications of the functional forms
are needed. Selecting a functional form for the
production function will lead to a system of
empirical equations. It is desirable that the
functional form does not impose severeap r i o r i
constraintsontheproductioncharacteristicsof
the industry. One functional form that has
been generally adopted is the transcendental
logarithmic (translog) production function
(Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau):
ð9Þ











bki ln Xk ln Xi,
where Xs are total industry inputs of pulp-
wood, labor, capital, and nonwood materials;
Q is total industry output of paper products;
and bs are coefficients. The translog produc-
tion function is symmetric in coefficients, i.e.,
bik 5 bki. From the above equation, the
marginal product for the kth input is









Substituting Equation (10) into Equa-


















where Sk 5 wkXk/(PQ) is the cost share
equation for the kth input (k 5 1, 2, 3, 4).
Static Estimation by I3SLS
Equations (9), (11), and (12) constitute a
system of five equations in total. For empirical
estimation, the production function and the
cost share equations are assumed to be
stochastic because of technical and optimiza-
tion errors. The errors are assumed to be
additive and jointly normally distributed with
zero mean and constant variance-covariance
matrix. However, in this study, the cost share
equations for S1 and S4 possesses a special
property in that for each observation the
nonwood materials cost is derived from
pulpwood input cost and therefore S1 and S4
add up to the cost share of total material
input. Hence only three of the four cost share
equations are linearly independent. This de-
pendency implies that the information in the
cost share equations is redundant and the
disturbance variance-covariance matrix is sin-
gular. The most common procedure for
handling this singularity problem is to drop
an arbitrary equation and then estimate the
remaining ones (Berndt; Bhuyan and Lopez).
Berndt has proved that all parameter estimates
and estimated standard errors will be invariant
to the choice of the cost share equation to be
excluded as long as maximum likelihood or
I3SLS estimation procedure is employed.
Since the pulpwood input market is of
concern, we choose to drop the cost share
equation for the nonwood materials. The
resulting system consists of a production
function and three cost share equations for
pulpwood, capital, and labor inputs.
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gated data are used so output and inputs are
assumed to be endogenous. To deal with
endogeneity problems in the simultaneous
equations, we employ an instrumental variable
estimator, I3SLS. The eight instrumental
variables included in the estimation are the
price for each of the four inputs, the national
four-firm concentration ratio for the U.S.
paper industry (m1), average mill capacity
(m2), per capita disposable income (m3), and a
time trend (m4). Furthermore, as exogenous
point estimates of the price elasticities, 20.4
and 0.3 are used for g and e, respectively
(Newman; Newman and Wear; Sun).
Estimation by I3SLS with
Time-Varying Parameters
The above econometric specification can only
estimate the static market conduct parameters,
h and Q. It cannot measure and demonstrate
their possible changes over time. Following
previous research (Murray; Schroeter and
Azzam), the equilibrium market conduct
parameters are taken to be a function of the
exogenous variables
ð13Þ h ~ h0 z h1m1,
ð14Þ j ~ j0 z j1m2 z j2m2
2,
where m1 and m2 are defined above as the
national four-firm concentration ratio and
average mill capacity. This allows h and Q to
vary over time, reflecting changes in the
economic environment.
Expression (13) and (14) can be substituted
into Equations (11) and (12) and included in
the system of equations for econometric
estimation. Fitted values of time-varying
market conduct parameters, theta ˆ and phi ˆ,
can be computed using the observed values for
the determining factors. Their respective
variance is computed by the Delta method
(Greene) using the covariance matrix of its
components’ parameter estimates. The statis-
tical significance of the degree of market
power is determined by t-statistics. For both
static and time-varying estimation, the sample
consists of annual data from 1955 to 2003. All
estimations are carried out using econometric
software EViews 5.
Data Sources and Variable Definitions
In this study, the U.S. paper industry is
defined to include paper mills and paperboard
mills (NAICS 32212/32213 or SIC 2621/2631).
The pulp mills sector (NAICS 32211 or SIC
2611) is excluded because the output from the
pulp mills is an intermediate input in paper
manufacturing. Most wood pulp is produced
and transferred within the paper and paper-
board sector (Murray), so including this sector
would overestimate the total industry output.
Annual data series from 1955 to 2003 are
constructed for each variable. The definitions,
data sources, and descriptive statistics of these
variables are presented in Table 1.
Specifically, the quantity of paper products
output (Q) is defined as the domestic produc-
tion of paper and paperboard in the U.S.
paper industry. Data for 1965–2002 come
from Howard and the rest from the National
Agricultural Statistics Service. The value of
paper products output (PQ) is needed in
computing the cost share for each input. It is
approximated by the industry value of ship-
ments plus change in inventory (U.S. Census
Bureau 2007a).
For specific factors, the quantity of wood
(X1) is the amount of pulpwood, chips and
residues, and recycled materials used by the
paper industry. Data for 1965–2002 are from
Howard and the rest from Adams, Haynes,
and Daigneault, and the National Agricultural
Statistics Service. The price of wood (w1)i s
calculated as volume-weighted average deliv-
ered price of softwood pulpwood, hardwood
pulpwood, and chips and residues. Delivered
prices of specific wood types for the southern
states from Norris is used to represent the
national timber price.
The quantity of labor (X2) is the total
annual hours of production and nonproduc-
tion workers (U.S. Census Bureau 2007a). The
number of nonproduction workers is defined
as the difference between the numbers of total
employees and production workers, and fur-
thermore each nonproduction worker is as-
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Total cost of labor equals total compensation
for employees, and it comprises payroll,
mandated benefits such as social security,
and other employer-supplied benefits (U.S.
Census Bureau 2007a). The price of labor (w2)
is equal to the total cost of labor divided by
the quantity of labor.
The quantity of capital (X3) is defined as
the sum of the value of net depreciable and
depletable assets, land, and inventories used
by the U.S. paper industry (Internal Revenue
Service), following Azzam and Pagoulatos.
The cost of capital is calculated as the sum of
interest, depreciation, depletion, and tax
expenses. A two-year average is used because
the data from the Internal Revenue Service
have been based on the fiscal year from July to
June while the calendar year is used in this
study. The price of capital (w3) equals the cost
of capital divided by the quantity of capital.
The price of nonwood materials (w4)i s
approximated by the price index of interme-
diate inputs in manufacturing for the paper
industry (U.S. Census Bureau 2007b). The
value of nonwood materials is computed as
Table 1. Variable Definition, Data Sources, and Descriptive Statistics
Symbol Variables Definition and data sources Mean SD
Q Quantity of paper
products output





PQ Value of paper
products output





X1 Quantity of wood Pulpwood, chips and residues, and recycled


















X3 Quantity of capital Sum of the value of net depreciable and




w3 Price of capital Sum of interest, depreciation, depletion and tax
expenses,
e divided by X3
0.16 0.03
w4 Price of nonwood
materials




X4 Quantity of nonwood
materials
Total cost of materials
b less the cost of wood
input, divided by w4
136.97 59.33




m2 Average mill capacity Total quantity of pulpwood input divided by the





m3 Per capita disposable
income





m4 Time trend Calendar year minus 1954 25.00 14.29
a Howard and the National Agricultural Statistics Service.
b U.S. Census Bureau (2007a).
c Adams, Haynes, and Daigneault; Howard; and the National Agricultural Statistics Service.
d Adams, Jackson, and Haynes; Norris.
e Internal Revenue Service.
f U.S. Census Bureau (2007b).
g Bureau of Economic Analysis
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pulpwood input (i.e., w1X1). The total cost of
materials includes the cost of raw materials
put into production or used for repair and
maintenance, cost of products bought and
sold in the same condition, cost of fuels
consumed for heat and power, cost of
purchased electricity, and cost of contract
work (U.S. Census Bureau 2007a). The
quantity of nonwood materials (X4)i se q u a l
to the value of nonwood materials divided by
its price.
Several instrumental variables are construct-
ed for the estimation by I3SLS. The industry
concentration ratio (m1) is approximated by
CR4inthepaperindustry(U.S.CensusBureau
2007a).Average mill capacity(m2) is defined as
the total quantity of pulpwood input divided
by the total number of establishment in the
paper industry (U.S. Census Bureau 2007a).
Per capita disposable income after taxes (m3)
comes from the database maintained by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. The time trend
(m4) is defined as the difference between the
calendar year and 1954.
Empirical Results
The estimation results by I3SLS are reported
in Table 2. The model fits well according to
several descriptive statistics. The Jarque-Bera
statistics fail to reject the hypothesis of
multivariate normal distribution of error
terms for all four equations. The highest
adjusted R
2 is 0.978 for the production
equation, and the lowest is 0.600 for the cost
share equation of labor input. By t-statistics, 8
of the 17 parameter estimates are significant at
Table 2. Estimates of the Parameters and Conjectural Elasticities for the U.S. Paper Industry
by I3SLS
Parameter Estimate t-Statistic p-Value
b0 21.024 2.493 0.014
b1 24.836 23.011 0.003
b2 20.093 20.095 0.924
b3 20.318 20.579 0.563
b4 5.192 2.556 0.011
b11 0.717 3.686 0.000
b12 0.104 1.444 0.150
b13 20.020 20.412 0.681
b14 20.595 22.874 0.005
b22 0.031 0.320 0.749
b23 0.019 0.535 0.593
b24 20.200 21.816 0.071
b33 0.073 2.307 0.022
b34 0.004 0.053 0.958
b44 0.480 1.273 0.205
Conjectural elasticity
Output market h 0.235 7.664 0.000




ln Q 0.978 2.111 0.348
S1 0.800 0.097 0.953
S2 0.600 2.974 0.226
S3 0.823 2.111 0.348
Wald test: (h 5 Q)
Test statistic Value df p-Value
Chi-square 1.378 1 0.241
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eters of conjectural elasticities, the estimates
for output and input markets are 0.235 and
0.516, respectively. Both of them are signifi-
cant at the 5% significance level or better. This
implies that there exists significant market
power in both the paper products output and
the pulpwood input markets. However, the
hypothesis of identical degree of market power
in both output and input markets could not be
rejected based on a Wald test at the 5%
significance level.
In contrast to the static estimation, the
adapted model with time-varying parameters
allows conjectural elasticities to change over
time. The parameter estimates and the statis-
tics for the model are reported in Table 3. The
magnitude of parameter estimates and overall
fit are comparable to those from static I3SLS
estimation. Time-varying conjectural elastici-
ties from 1955 to 2003 are generated by fitted
values of Equations (13) and (14). The stan-
dard deviations of the conjectural elasticities
computed by Delta Method allow tests of its
statistical significance. These time-varying
conjectural elasticities are presented in Ta-
ble 4.
For the paper products output market, the
conjectural elasticity estimates have been
significant at the 1% level throughout the
whole sample period. The estimate of oligop-
oly power (h ˆ) is relatively steady with a small
increase over time. The positive sign of h1
confirms the intuition that the more concen-
trated the industry, the more potential oligop-
oly power. In addition, the oligopoly power in
the output market has been consistently below
the oligopsony power in the wood input
market over the sample period. The measured
departures from competition are small with
Table 3. Estimates of the Parameters for the U.S. Paper Industry by I3SLS with Time-
Varying Parameters
Parameter Estimate t-Statistic p-Value
b0 21.367 2.151 0.033
b1 24.467 22.415 0.017
b2 0.004 0.004 0.997
b3 20.975 21.547 0.124
b4 5.330 2.408 0.017
b11 0.598 2.822 0.005
b12 0.130 1.695 0.092
b13 0.050 0.843 0.401
b14 20.559 22.614 0.010
b22 20.024 20.227 0.820
b23 0.037 0.987 0.325
b24 20.249 22.080 0.039
b33 0.128 2.978 0.003
b34 20.155 21.456 0.147
b44 0.745 1.911 0.058
h0 0.218 6.206 0.000
h1 0.000 1.595 0.113
Q0 0.577 1.938 0.054
Q1 20.002 20.470 0.639




ln Q 0.978 2.605 0.272
S1 0.830 0.953 0.621
S2 0.554 3.693 0.158
S3 0.860 0.922 0.631
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Year
Oligopoly Power (paper products output) Oligopsony Power (pulpwood input)
h t-statistic Q t-statistic
1955 0.2260 6.8443 0.5249 2.2980
1956 0.2264 6.8789 0.5243 2.3024
1957 0.2268 6.9134 0.5246 2.2999
1958 0.2273 6.9477 0.5246 2.3004
1959 0.2277 6.9819 0.5233 2.3088
1960 0.2281 7.0159 0.5231 2.3097
1961 0.2285 7.0497 0.5229 2.3113
1962 0.2289 7.0832 0.5228 2.3122
1963 0.2293 7.1166 0.5230 2.3119
1964 0.2292 7.1083 0.5235 2.3106
1965 0.2289 7.0832 0.5230 2.3119
1966 0.2291 7.0999 0.5237 2.3098
1967 0.2293 7.1166 0.5235 2.3106
1968 0.2295 7.1276 0.5250 2.3063
1969 0.2296 7.1388 0.5269 2.3014
1970 0.2298 7.1497 0.5263 2.3029
1971 0.2297 7.1415 0.5272 2.3007
1972 0.2285 7.0497 0.5314 2.2928
1973 0.2284 7.0429 0.5352 2.2877
1974 0.2283 7.0362 0.5353 2.2876
1975 0.2283 7.0294 0.5273 2.3004
1976 0.2282 7.0226 0.5360 2.2869
1977 0.2281 7.0159 0.5395 2.2839
1978 0.2280 7.0091 0.5454 2.2814
1979 0.2279 7.0023 0.5539 2.2818
1980 0.2278 6.9955 0.5574 2.2830
1981 0.2278 6.9887 0.5645 2.2872
1982 0.2277 6.9819 0.5608 2.2848
1983 0.2286 7.0530 0.5814 2.3038
1984 0.2294 7.1233 0.5981 2.3265
1985 0.2303 7.1925 0.5958 2.3232
1986 0.2312 7.2606 0.6171 2.3574
1987 0.2321 7.3275 0.6393 2.3976
1988 0.2319 7.3117 0.6518 2.4214
1989 0.2317 7.2958 0.6535 2.4246
1990 0.2314 7.2799 0.6649 2.4466
1991 0.2312 7.2638 0.6699 2.4563
1992 0.2310 7.2477 0.6917 2.4988
1993 0.2313 7.2709 0.7072 2.5287
1994 0.2316 7.2939 0.7396 2.5887
1995 0.2319 7.3168 0.7458 2.5997
1996 0.2322 7.3395 0.7555 2.6165
1997 0.2325 7.3620 0.7960 2.6813
1998 0.2338 7.4567 0.7068 2.5279
1999 0.2477 8.2024 0.7113 2.5364
2000 0.2364 7.6356 0.6945 2.5043
2001 0.2377 7.7193 0.6594 2.4359
2002 0.2390 7.7988 0.6413 2.4014
2003 0.2390 7.7988 0.5987 2.3275
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power from a five firm symmetric Cournot
equilibrium (Kinnucan; Sexton). Over 1955–
2003, the maximum value of h ˆ is 0.2477 in
1999, the minimum is 0.2260 in 1955, and the
average is 0.2310.
For the pulpwood input market, the
conjectural elasticity estimates have been
significant at the 5% level for the sample
period. The estimate of oligopsony power (Q ˆ)
decreased slightly until 1962 when it begins to
increase. In 1997, it peaks at 0.796 and then
levels off to the average. As an indicator of
price competition at the spatial market
boundaries (Murray), the negative sign of
average mill capacity (Q1) suggests that the
more intensive the border competition is, the
lower oligopsonistic tendency is for mills to
restrict pulpwood inputs. Over 1955–2003, the
maximum value of Q ˆ is 0.7960 in 1997, the
minimum is 0.5228 in 1962, and the average is
0.5922.
In summary, the null hypotheses of price-
taking conduct in both the paper products
output and pulpwood input markets are
rejected. The U.S. paper industry has tended
to exert both oligopoly and oligopsony power
over the past several decades. While the
oligopoly power remains stable with a trend
of a slight increase, the oligopsony power has
fluctuated over time. For the whole sample
period, the oligopoly power has been consis-
tently lower than the oligopsony power.
Conclusions
Market power studies for the paper industry
generally examine one side of the market.
Studies addressing market power on both
output and input markets simultaneously have
been limited. Furthermore, the majority of
previous studies have employed static estima-
tion and they are limited in revealing the time-
varying characteristics of market power indi-
ces. In this study, the NEIO approach and
econometric model with time-varying param-
eters are combined to examine the market
behavior of the U.S. paper industry. Annual
data from 1955 to 2003 are used in the
estimation. This study extends the market
power research in the U.S. paper industry by
examining the dynamics of market power in
bothoutputandinputmarketssimultaneously.
The empirical results reveal the presence of
market power in both the paper products
output and pulpwood input markets in the
past several decades. The rapid growth in
oligopsony power from the mid-1980s is likely
explained by an increasingly geographically
concentrated pulpwood market over that
period, whereas the downturn of oligopsony
power since the late 1990s coincides with the
expanding use of recycled materials in the U.S.
paper industry. Haynes shows that use of
recycled materials mitigates the demand for
virgin wood fiber. The impact of market
power exertion in the U.S. paper industry
has been twofold. In the paper products
output market, the oligopoly power is expect-
ed to reduce demand for paper products
output, whereas in the pulpwood input
market, the oligopsony power is expected to
depress pulpwood input price. This is evi-
denced by declining per capita consumption of
paper and persistent low prices for softwood
pulpwood for the past 10 years (Wear, Carter,
and Prestemon). Collectively, the oligopoly
and oligopsony power may allow the paper
industry to advantageously adjust production
and operate with greater profit margins.
Market power presence in the U.S. paper
industry also implies an inefficient allocation
of resources, a reduction in consumer and
producer surpluses, and therefore a loss in
social welfare (Asinas).
It should be noted that although the NEIO
approach can detect the degree of market
power, it is limited in identifying its sources
(Bresnahan). In this study, the oligopoly
power is assumed to change with the national
four-firm concentration ratio, whereas the
oligopsony power is assumed to vary with
average mill capacity. However, those specifi-
cations are subjective. Other factors, like
market shocks, economic cycles, environmen-
tal regulations, and international trade, have
also been perceived to be related to market
power in the U.S. paper industry (Asinas).
Given the results of market power variation in
the U.S. paper industry over time, this study
Mei and Sun: Oligopoly in the U.S. Paper Industry 937brings up several interesting questions. Future
research can examine what factors determine
the variation in market power; how market
power influences the welfare of forest land-
owners and paper products retailers; and what
the implication is to investments in the
forestry and forest products industry.
[Received July 2007; Accepted April 2008.]
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